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HUGH C. PHILLIPS

Liberating Liberty: How the Glucksberg Test Can
Solve the Supreme Court’s Confusing Jurisprudence
on Parental Rights
ABSTRACT
This Note examines the Supreme Court’s parental rights jurisprudence
under a substantive due process theory. While the Supreme Court’s current
precedent regarding parental rights is confusing, a careful and disciplined
application of the Court’s history and tradition test for determining
substantive due process would clarify and protect these rights. This would
not only clarify parental rights but provide a path forward for the Court to
define and protect other unenumerated, fundamental rights. To make this
argument, this Note identifies the Court’s substantive due process
jurisprudence and the history of parental rights in the law, providing a
solution that would clarify both parental rights and substantive due process.
Section II provides an overview of the Court’s current substantive due
process jurisprudence, its tests, and the methods it uses to determine and
define unenumerated, fundamental rights. The genesis of due process is
recounted, the history and tradition and ordered liberty tests are reviewed,
and the Court’s current application of these tests discussed. The case is made
that the current framework is not consistently applied by the Court and is
thus causing difficulty in defining and protecting unenumerated rights.
Section III of this Note argues that the Court’s misapplication of its
substantive due process tests has left a confused and unworkable parental
rights jurisprudence. To highlight this, the Court’s decision in Troxel v.
Granville is discussed. Also, the effects of sociological positivism and the
doctrine of parens patria and their effects on the use of substantive due
process to parental rights are overviewed. Overall, the problem with using
opinion and social conscience to formulate and define a right is revealed.
Section IV sets forth the author’s proposed solution. A disciplined and
careful application of the Court’s history and tradition test as provided in
Washington v. Glucksberg would not only help to identify and define
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unenumerated rights like parental rights, but it would also provide a test to
clarify the scope of such rights. Application of this test to parental rights
would clarify their fundamental nature and ensure the use of strict scrutiny
when considering a government infringement on these rights.
Thus, instead of arguing for immediate change to the law, this Note
attempts to apply the current framework to protect parental rights and clarify
how the Court should handle fundamental, unenumerated rights. Careful
application of Glucksberg’s history and tradition test would provide a
comprehensive answer. While the long-term effects of substantive due
process must be considered, this Note provides an immediate solution.

AUTHOR
Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.S., Government: Prelaw, Liberty University (2019). This Note is dedicated with great gratitude to
my parents, Geoffrey and Jacqueline Phillips, without whose support this
would not be possible. Also, to Christopher J. Horton and Jonah Echols.
Finally, and most importantly, to my beloved wife, Sarah, without whom I
would never have succeeded.
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NOTE
LIBERATING LIBERTY: HOW THE GLUCKSBERG TEST CAN SOLVE
THE SUPREME COURT’S CONFUSING JURISPRUDENCE ON
PARENTAL RIGHTS
Hugh C. Phillips†
I. INTRODUCTION
Parental rights are one of the most important and fundamental,
unenumerated rights protected by our constitutional system. Yet parental
rights, especially regarding children’s education, have recently come to the
forefront of political debate in the United States. The conflict was brought
into focus when a well-known Democrat politician exclaimed in a
gubernatorial debate: “I don’t think parents should be telling schools what
they should teach.”1 This debate and increasing regulation of children at
schools to combat COVID-19 caused mass protests at school board meetings
and spurred several states to introduce parental rights legislation.2 Much has
†
Senior Staff, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 16; J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2022); B.S., Government: Pre-law, Liberty University (2019). This
Note is dedicated with great gratitude to my parents, Geoffrey and Jacqueline Phillips,
without whose support this would not be possible. Also, to Christopher J. Horton and Jonah
Echols. Finally, and most importantly, to my beloved wife, Sarah, without whom I would
never have succeeded.
1
Virginia Gubernatorial Debate, C-SPAN, at 30:11 (Sept. 28, 2021), https://www.cspan.org/video/?514874-1/virginia-gubernatorial-debate.
2
Jack Schneider & Jennifer Berkshire, Parents Claim They Have the Right to Shape Their
Kids’ School Curriculum. They Don’t., WASH. POST (Oct. 21, 2021, 12:00 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/parents-rights-protestskids/2021/10/21/5cf4920a-31d4-11ec-9241-aad8e48f01ff_story.html; Phillip Hamburger, Is
the Public School System Constitutional, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 22, 2021, 6:41 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/public-school-system-constitutional-private-mcauli!e-freespeech-11634928722; H.R. Res. 241, 2021 H. Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021) (“The state . . . may not
infringe on the fundamental rights of a parent to direct the upbringing, education, health
care, and mental health of his or her minor child without demonstrating that such action is
reasonable and necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that such action is
narrowly tailored and is not otherwise served by a less restrictive means.”); S. Res. 996, Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. 2022 (Pa. 2022) (“General rule.--The liberty of a parent to direct the
upbringing, education, care and welfare of the parent's child is a fundamental right.”); H.R.
Res. 1995, 101st Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2022) (“No governmental entity, school
district, or other public institution shall infringe on the fundamental rights of a parent to
direct the upbringing, education, health care, or mental health of such parent’s minor child
without first demonstrating that such infringement is reasonable, narrowly tailored to
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been said about the Supreme Court’s recognition of parental rights. Yet,
absent from this conversation, at least among the legal community, is a
discussion of the appropriate standard of review the judiciary should apply
when faced with a parental rights issue. The Court should hold that parental
rights are fundamental and apply strict scrutiny to these and other rights that
meet the substantive due process test for fundamental rights.
The American legal system was designed to protect the rights and liberties
of every citizen. In an effort to accomplish this goal, the Framers enshrined
key liberties within the Bill of Rights.3 However, these rights enshrined within
the Constitution have never been considered exclusive. In fact, the question
remains open in American law of how to best identify and protect
fundamental rights that are unenumerated in the Constitution.4 For the past
century, the Supreme Court used substantive due process to protect
fundamental liberties, such as parental rights, that are not specifically
enumerated within the Constitution.5 Under the doctrine of substantive due
process, the Court forbids any governmental interference with such rights
“unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state
interest.”6
The use of this doctrine to protect such rights has long been a debated
question in legal scholarship. How the Court uses substantive due process
and by what test it identifies and governs unenumerated constitutional rights
has tremendous ramifications for defining and protecting those rights. The
Court has utilized numerous tests in an attempt to define and protect those
rights.7 However, the Court has never consistently applied a single, coherent
test.
When applying substantive due process, only a strict application of
Washington v. Glucksberg’s “history and tradition test”8 to unenumerated
constitutional rights will sufficiently protect fundamental liberties. The
Court’s substantive due process jurisprudence, in light of Glucksberg’s
application, will be examined to consider whether such a test successfully
achieve a compelling state interest, and that such interest could not otherwise be served by
less restrictive means.”).
3
See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X (encompassing what is known as the Bill of Rights).
4
See O. John Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 787, 787–88, 790 (1959).
5
See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923); Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 499–504 (1977); see also Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 382–86 (1978).
6
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).
7
See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (expounding on the “orderly pursuit of happiness”); see also
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937); Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (focusing on the
history and tradition test); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
8
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
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protects parental and other unenumerated rights. First, the Court’s
substantive due process framework will be considered along with the tests the
Court has used to identify and define fundamental rights. Second, the
problems with the Court’s current application of the tests will be discussed,
including the confusion that the Court’s approach has caused within
constitutional rights jurisprudence. Finally, Glucksberg’s history and
tradition test will be applied in a disciplined and careful fashion as a solution
to the current confusion in the Court’s parental rights jurisprudence.
Current substantive due process jurisprudence fails to properly identify
and define unenumerated, fundamental constitutional rights and does not
provide a consistent framework for determining how or why an individual
right is considered fundamental. Yet under the proposed standard, a
purported fundamental constitutional right would first be carefully defined,
and then that definition alone would undergo a historical analysis to
determine whether it is truly a fundamental constitutional right.9 A careful
definition of parental rights and a historical analysis of those rights under the
Glucksberg standard reveal that parental rights should be protected as
fundamental and governed by a strict scrutiny standard.10 The Court should
reconsider its standard of review for parental rights jurisprudence under the
Glucksberg standard to better protect parental rights and create a more
coherent application of substantive due process regarding fundamental
rights.
II. BACKGROUND
Parental rights have long been protected by the Supreme Court using the
doctrine of substantive due process.11 Substantive due process has often
sparked controversy because it is used by the Supreme Court to identify and
protect what the Court both saw, and continues to see, as the fundamental
liberties of Americans.12 The Court originally derived its substantive due
process analysis from the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.13 This Amendment was passed immediately after the Civil War
to ensure that all Americans, but especially African-Americans, who were

9

Id. at 721.
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 80 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring); Glucksberg, 521
U.S. at 720–21.
11
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 65–66.
12
Timothy M. Tymkovich, Joshua Dos Santos & Joshua J. Craddock, A Workable
Substantive Due Process, 95 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1961, 1962 (2020).
13
See CALVIN MASSEY & BRANNON P. DENNING, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: POWERS
AND LIBERTIES 461–62 (6th ed. 2019); see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 56 (1905).
10
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recently freed from slavery, received justice under the law.14
The Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to ensure “due process of
law” before any citizens are subjected to the forcible removal of their “life,
liberty, or property” at the hands of the government.15 Although on its face
this requirement is largely procedural, the Court has expanded the Due
Process Clause to protect the unenumerated liberties of citizens from
arbitrary government interference.16 While this seemed to benefit American
law, expanding the meaning of the Due Process Clause through substantive
due process created significant drawbacks. The Court has overly exalted
“autonomy” and “individualism” in the law through its focus on modern
individual rights such as abortion and gay marriage, while leaving more
traditional liberties, such as parental rights, unprotected.17 The apparent
selective nature of the Court’s jurisprudence regarding parental rights and
other liberties incited ongoing debate over the proper role of the judiciary in
defining the nature and boundary of fundamental human rights.18 Against
this backdrop, the Court’s dilemma over parental rights arose and is brought
into focus.
A.

History of Substantive Due Process

Substantive due process is derived from the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.19 Yet,
substantive due process was a relative latecomer to due process
jurisprudence.20 Although the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified in 1868
directly after the Civil War, the Court did not immediately derive substantive
rights out of the Due Process Clause.21 In the famous Slaughter-House Cases,
the Court was confronted by a due process question arising out of the
Fourteenth Amendment and refused to extend the Clause past its procedural

14
Laurent Frantz, Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment, 9 LAWS. GUILD REV. 122,
122–23 (1949).
15
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
16
MASSEY & DENNING, supra note 13, at 461; Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
17
See generally Rena M. Lindevaldsen, When the Pursuit of Liberty Collides with the Rule
of Law, 11 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 667 (2017) (containing a fuller discussion on this topic).
18
ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN LIBERALISM AND
AMERICAN DECLINE 65, 96–119 (Harper Perennial rev. ed. 2003).
19
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
20
See William R. Musgrove, Substantive Due Process: A History of Liberty in the Due
Process Clause, 2 U. ST. THOMAS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 125, 126 (2008).
21
See id. at 127–28 (discussing that it seems substantive due process originally was the
means by which the Court incorporated the Bill of Rights onto the States).
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foundation through a doctrine of incorporation.22
When the Court first decided to make use of the substantive due process
doctrine in Lochner v. New York, it was to support economic liberty.23 In
Lochner, the Court determined that while the State possessed the authority to
exercise general police powers through legislation, it could not arbitrarily
pass laws that had no valid governmental interest because this would violate
the economic liberty interest inherent in the Fourteenth Amendment.24 Over
the next several decades, the Court used this theory of substantive due
process to limit legislative authority and declare hundreds of government
regulations invalid infringements on economic liberty.25 Yet, this age of
substantive due process came to a sharp halt when the Court decided
Ferguson v. Skrupa and repudiated the doctrine of substantive due process
entirely.26 As the Court noted:
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins,
Burns, and like cases--that due process authorizes courts to
hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature
has acted unwisely--has long since been discarded. We have
returned to the original constitutional proposition that
courts do not substitute their social and economic beliefs for
the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass
laws.27
Despite this stark repudiation, it did not take long for the Supreme Court
to revive substantive due process. However, the Court shifted its focus from
protecting property rights under the doctrine to expanding liberty interests
protected under the Clause.28 The Court began this new era of substantive
due process by applying it to protect parental rights. In Meyer v. Nebraska,
the Court resoundingly protected parental rights by applying the Due Process
Clause to protect the liberty interest of parents in having their children taught
another language at school without government interference.29 The Court,
referring to the liberty interests protected by the Clause, reasoned:

22
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80–81 (1872); MASSEY & DENNING, supra note 13, at
469–71.
23
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
24
Id. at 53–54.
25
Musgrove, supra note 20, at 129; e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915).
26
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 729 (1963).
27
Id. at 730.
28
MASSEY & DENNING, supra note 13, at 486–87.
29
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
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While this Court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has received
much consideration . . . . Without doubt, [liberty] denotes
not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right
of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry,
establish a home and bring up children, to worship God
according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men.30
The Court eventually expanded its application of the substantive due
process framework from parental rights to other societal liberties as
exemplified by Griswold v. Connecticut.31 In Griswold, the Court struck down
a state statute banning the use of contraceptives by married couples on the
basis that the ban interfered with couples’ privacy interests as protected by
the Due Process Clause.32 While declining to “sit as a super-legislature to
determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws,” the Court used an
expansive view of liberty found in freedom of association to rule that the
statute was unconstitutional.33
The Court solidified its new substantive due process “liberty”
jurisprudence when it used the Equal Protection Clause and Due Process
Clause to protect the right of a bi-racial couple to marry, and again in Roe v.
Wade when the Court declared a fundamental right to abortion.34 Since then,
the Court has used the doctrine of substantive due process to make
substantial changes in the country’s social policy, such as declaring sodomy
laws unconstitutional, legalizing same-sex marriage, and redefining the
meaning of sex.35 Some of the changes brought under the substantive due
process doctrine were necessary and just,36 while others were made by judicial

30

Id. at 399.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482–85 (1965).
32
Id. at 485.
33
Id. at 482.
34
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973).
35
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015);
Bostock v. Clayton Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 1731 (2020).
36
See, e.g., Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
31
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fiat and have deeply divided the nation.37 The history of the Court’s
substantive due process jurisprudence leaves critical questions unanswered,
such as how the Court should define liberty under the Fourteenth
Amendment, what the role of the judiciary is in defining fundamental rights,
and what rights truly should be protected.
B.

Tests of the Court’s Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence

The Supreme Court has used several tests throughout its substantive due
process jurisprudence to identify and protect rights the Court deemed
fundamental. The test the Court uses to determine fundamental liberties such
as parental rights is critical because the test determines the substance and
extent of the right. When examining any unenumerated right under
substantive due process, a court must determine (1) whether a liberty interest
is at stake and (2) whether it is fundamental.38 There are various substantive
due process tests the Court has used to identify and protect fundamental
liberties, such as parental rights.
As a preliminary matter, when analyzing fundamental rights under
substantive due process, the key term to consider is liberty. It is this “liberty”
interest in the Fourteenth Amendment that is used to define the limits of
unenumerated fundamental rights. Shockingly, the Court has never defined
the limits of “liberty.”39 Early American jurists defined the term as “freedom
from restraint.”40 Specifically, the founding generation seemed to argue that
the Constitution protects “civil liberty,” which Noah Webster in his first
American dictionary defined as “the liberty of men in a state of society, or
natural liberty so far only abridged and restrained as is necessary and
expedient for the safety and interest of the society, state, or nation.”41 Thus,
at its core, liberty is the freedom of an individual to act confined only by his
37
The author does not mean to assert by this statement any manner of support for
judicial activism in any form. Rather, the author supports the authority of the Court, within
its judicial role, to strike down laws that are blatantly unconstitutional or contrary to the laws
of nature and nature’s God, even if such laws happen to be based on current cultural norms.
38
Jeffrey C. Tuomala, The Casebook Companion to Constitutional Law, pt. 7, ch. 4:
Substantive Due Process, 3–4 (Oct. 30, 2019) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
author).
39
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
40
Liberty, NOAH WEBSTER’S FIRST EDITION OF AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE (Found. for Am. Christian Educ. 18th prtg. 2006) (1828).
41
Civil liberty, NOAH WEBSTER’S FIRST EDITION OF AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE (Found. for Am. Christian Educ. 18th prtg. 2006) (1828) (“Civil liberty is
an exemption from the arbitrary will of others, which exemption is secured by established
laws, which restrain every man from injuring or controlling another. Hence the restraints of
law are essential to civil liberty.”).
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obligations and duties as a citizen and neighbor.42 Yet, the Court has not
adopted this definition of liberty and instead opts for a much more “solitary,
unconnected, individual, selfish liberty, as if every man was to regulate the
whole of his conduct by his own will.”43 As a result, the Court struggles to
develop proper tests for determining fundamental rights and has never held
consistently to one approach.
While the Court has used many tests in its attempts to define and protect
fundamental rights, historically two tests have predominated: the ordered
liberty test and the history and tradition test.44 The ordered liberty test was
developed first45 but the history and tradition test now carries the most
weight with the Court.46 However, both tests have had a tremendous impact
on parental rights.
1.

The Ordered Liberty Test

The first test the Court formulated was the ordered liberty test.47 This test
appears to have its origin in the natural law heritage of American
jurisprudence because the Court used the concept to strike down
government action long before the Fourteenth Amendment was written.48 A
perfect example of this is the Supreme Court’s decision in Fletcher v. Peck
where the Court upheld the transfer of stolen Indian lands and prevented the
transfer from being annulled because the land was possessed by innocent

42
EDMUND BURKE, FURTHER REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 7–8 (Daniel E.
Ritchie ed., 1992) (expounding a conservative view of liberty by noting that “[i]t is not
solitary, unconnected, individual, selfish liberty, as if every man was to regulate the whole of
his conduct by his own will. The liberty I mean is social freedom. It is that state of things in
which liberty is secured by the equality of restraint. A constitution of things in which the
liberty of no one man, and no body of men, and no number of men, can find means to
trespass on the liberty of any person, or any description of persons, in the society. This kind
of liberty is, indeed, but another name for justice; ascertained by wise laws, and secured by
well-constructed institutions.”).
43
Id. at 7.
44
The author has confined his analysis to these two tests because these tests are the only
ones that grapple with defining an unenumerated right. Other tests, such as the “shocks the
conscience test” are much more fact centered and practical and do not delve into the issue of
unenumerated rights.
45
See Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1926); see also Palko v. Connecticut, 302
U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937) (elucidating the ordered liberty test).
46
See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
47
See O. John Rogge, Concept of Ordered Liberty: A New Case, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 238, 248
(1959) (“But the concept underlying due process of law began in the phrase, per legem terrae,
by the law of the land.”).
48
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 87, 132–34 (1810); MASSEY & DENNING, supra note 13, at 461.
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parties.49 In making this decision, the Court stated that “there are certain
great principles of justice, whose authority is universally acknowledged, that
ought not to be entirely disregarded” and that “[i]t may well be doubted
whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe some
limits to the legislative power.”50
This framework was retained and expounded on by the Court when it
began to formulate the ordered liberty test during the Lochner era.51 The
Court applied this framework to substantive due process in Hebert v.
Louisiana when it determined that “state action, whether through one agency
or another, shall be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and
justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political institutions and not
infrequently are designated as ‘law of the land.’”52 This reasoning was
affirmed in Palko v. Connecticut when the Court reasoned that using the
Hebert test to determine whether a state action violated a principle that is
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty” was the crux of a substantive due
process claim.53
While this view of substantive due process was quashed by the Court in
Benton v. Maryland, the test made a comeback in the Court’s landmark
case—Bowers v. Hardwick.54 In Bowers, the Court rejected a claim that
criminalizing sodomy was a violation of fundamental rights.55 In doing so,
however, it directly returned to Palko’s ordered liberty standard to prevent
the Court from simply manufacturing rights out of whole cloth.56 In defense
of its decision, the Court stated that, as an institution:
[It] is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy
when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having
little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the
Constitution. . . . There should be, therefore, great resistance
to expand the substantive reach of those Clauses,
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights
49

Fletcher, 10 U.S. at 139–40.
Id. at 133, 135; MASSEY & DENNING, supra note 13, at 461.
51
See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53–54 (1905).
52
Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316–17 (1926).
53
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 324–25 (1937); Robert C. Farrell, An Excess of
Methods: Identifying Implied Fundamental Rights in the Supreme Court, 26 ST. LOUIS U. PUB.
L. REV. 203, 222–23 (2007).
54
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794–95 (1969); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
190–96 (1986).
55
Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
56
Id. at 194–95.
50
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deemed to be fundamental. Otherwise, the Judiciary
necessarily takes to itself further authority to govern the
country without express constitutional authority.57
While Bowers was later overturned by the Court’s decision in Lawrence v.
Texas, the ordered liberty test has retained a place in the Court’s
jurisprudence: as a factor in the Court’s history and tradition test as
elucidated in Washington v. Glucksberg and as defended in Justice Scalia’s
dissent in Lawrence.58
2.

The History and Tradition Test

The second and more recent test the Court used to determine and define
fundamental rights under substantive due process is the history and tradition
test. This test was first posited by the Court in 1934 in Snyder v.
Massachusetts.59 In Snyder, the Court upheld a state murder conviction
against procedural and substantive due process claims.60 However, the Court
defined a new test for identifying fundamental liberties under substantive
due process when it held that state action would not be overturned “unless in
so doing it offends some principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”61
The Court further applied and developed this test in Moore v. City of East
Cleveland.62 In Moore, the Court reasoned that “[a]ppropriate limits on
substantive due process come not from drawing arbitrary lines but rather
from careful ‘respect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of
the basic values that underlie our society.’”63 Thus, only those rights that are
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition” will be afforded
fundamental status and protection under the Due Process Clause.64 Critical
to the background and thrust of this Note, however, is the fact that the Court
first developed this test in Moore around a claim of parental rights and
familial privacy.65
The Court further developed its history and tradition test for determining
57

Id.
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 593 n.3 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Washington v.
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997).
59
Farrell, supra note 53, at 225–26.
60
Id.; Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 122 (1934).
61
Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105; Farrell, supra note 53, at 226.
62
Farrell, supra note 53, at 226.
63
Moore, 431 U.S. at 503.
64
Id. at 503.
65
Id. at 503–05.
58
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fundamental rights when it used history and tradition as a key factor in
deciding Bowers v. Hardwick and determined that there was not a historical
right to homosexual sodomy.66 However, the Court further expanded the test
in its decision in Michael H. v. Gerald D.67 In this case, the Court denied a
paternal rights claim because the father’s claim was not consistent with the
history and tradition of the United States.68 Justice Scalia, writing for the
majority, noted:
In an attempt to limit and guide interpretation of the Clause,
we have insisted not merely that the interest denominated as
a “liberty” be “fundamental” (a concept that, in isolation, is
hard to objectify), but also that it be an interest traditionally
protected by our society. As we have put it, the Due Process
Clause affords only those protections “so rooted in the
traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.”69
Justice Scalia further articulated this view of the history and tradition test
in Reno v. Flores where he explained that if substantive due process is to be
properly used to protect fundamental rights, the right must be thoroughly
defined and then subjected to a historical analysis strictly limited to that
definition.70 Thus, novel rights or those not having a long history of
acceptance within American society would not meet this test.71
The best articulation of the history and tradition test, however, was in the
Court’s decision in Washington v. Glucksberg where the Court declined to
recognize a fundamental right to assisted suicide.72 In Glucksberg, Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, reaffirmed the history and tradition test and
restated Justice Scalia’s two-pronged analysis: (1) carefully define the right
and (2) subject that definition to a strict history and tradition analysis.73 In
defense of this test, Justice Rehnquist reasoned that:
[T]he development of this Court’s substantive-due-process
jurisprudence . . . has been a process whereby the outlines of
66
67
68
69
70
71
72

Farrell, supra note 53, at 227.
Id. at 227–28.
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 122.
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302–03 (1993); Farrell, supra note 53, at 228–30.
Flores, 507 U.S. at 303.
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 705–07 (1997); Farrell, supra note 53, at 230–

31.
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Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720–21; see Farrell, supra note 53, at 230.
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the “liberty” specially protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment--never fully clarified, to be sure, and perhaps
not capable of being fully clarified--have at least been
carefully refined by concrete examples involving
fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our legal
tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective
elements that are necessarily present in due-process judicial
review. In addition, by establishing a threshold requirement-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental
right--before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a
legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the
need for complex balancing of competing interests in every
case.74
Since its formulation in Glucksberg, the history and tradition test has been
used sporadically by the Court to determine and protect fundamental
rights.75 The test was applied in Lawrence v. Texas,76 although the majority
was roundly criticized by Justice Scalia for what he considered to be the lack
of strict application of the test.77 Further, the test was mentioned but not
really applied by the majority in Obergefell v. Hodges.78 However, the test was
championed and reaffirmed by Chief Justice Roberts in his dissent.79
These two tests, the history and tradition test and the ordered liberty test,
are at the forefront of the Court’s struggle to define fundamental liberties
through a substantive view of the Due Process Clause. While these tests have
not been universally applied by the Court, the ordered liberty test is
essentially subsumed into the history and tradition test. When it comes to
parental rights, the tests provide a framework from which to determine
whether current law adequately protects parental rights or whether a new test
or other, more drastic, solutions are needed.
74

Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 722.
Dist. Att’y’s Off. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 72 (2009).
76
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003).
77
Id. at 594–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court today does not overrule this holding.
Not once does it describe homosexual sodomy as a ‘fundamental right’ or a ‘fundamental
liberty interest,’ nor does it subject the Texas statute to strict scrutiny. Instead, having failed
to establish that the right to homosexual sodomy is ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history
and tradition,’ the Court concludes that the application of Texas’s statute to petitioners’
conduct fails the rational-basis test, and overrules Bowers’ holding to the contrary. . . . In any
event, an ‘emerging awareness’ is by definition not ‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
traditions,’ as we have said ‘fundamental right’ status requires.”).
78
Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 671–72 (2015).
79
Id. at 698–99, 704–13 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
75
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III. THE PROBLEM WITH PARENTAL RIGHTS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
Despite the presence of these tests, the numerous Supreme Court cases on
parental rights in the early twentieth century, and the array of Supreme Court
dicta on the nature and importance of parental rights, the current state of
parental rights protections under the law is unclear. Further, the circuit
courts have struggled to apply the Court’s precedents on this issue.80 In fact,
the Fourth Circuit noted in Hodge v. Jones that “[t]here is little, if any, clear
guidance in the relevant caselaw that would permit us to chart with certainty
the amorphous boundaries between the Scylla of familial privacy and the
Charybdis of legitimate governmental interests.”81 In making determinations
of law, the First and Fifth Circuits have likewise struggled to determine where
to set the boundary between parental rights and proper state interests.82
While acknowledging the importance of parental rights, these circuits
complain that the Supreme Court has given no “clear” guidance on how
important this right is and which substantive due process test should be used
when examining parental rights.83
A.

Troxel v. Granville and the Court’s Confusion Regarding Parental
Rights

The Court’s confusion about the extent and importance of parental rights
is somewhat surprising given the Court’s past dicta about the significance of
this area of law. Yet, no case shows the underlying confusion as to the nature
and scope of parental rights more clearly than the Court’s most recent
excursion into parental rights.84 In Troxel v. Granville, the Court considered
parental rights in the context of a child visitation dispute between two
unmarried individuals.85 Specifically, the Court considered whether
awarding visitation rights to the Troxels was a denial of Granville’s parental
rights under substantive due process.86 The Court held that the specific
80

Hodge v. Jones, 31 F.3d 157, 164 (4th Cir. 1994).
Id.; see also Frazier v. Bailey, 957 F.2d 920, 931 (1st Cir. 1992) (“[T]he dimensions of
[the] right [to familial privacy] have yet to be clearly established.”); Michael P. Farris, The
Confused Character of Parental Rights in the Aftermath of Troxel, PARENTAL RTS. FOUND.,
Feb. 20, 2009, at 5, https://parentalrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Aftermath-ofTroxel.pdf.
82
Frazier, 957 F.2d at 931 (“[T]he dimensions of [the] right [to familial privacy] have yet
to be clearly established.”); Doe v. Louisiana, 2 F.3d 1412, 1416 (5th Cir. 1993) (noting while
there is a constitutional right to “family integrity,” it is not clearly established).
83
Frazier, 957 F.2d at 931.
84
See generally Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
85
Id. at 61–62.
86
Id. at 63–65.
81
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application of Washington’s visitation statute denied Granville of her
parental rights under substantive due process because the State did not take
into account “Granville’s fundamental right to make decisions concerning
the care, custody, and control of her two daughters.”87 The Court reasoned
that the “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case--the interest of parents in
the care, custody, and control of their children--is perhaps the oldest of the
fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.”88 With these words,
the Court reminded the legal community that parental rights have
historically and continue to be one of the most important liberty interests
that American law protects.89
While the majority in Troxel upheld the historical definition of parental
rights and affirmed its importance—even labeling them “fundamental” rights
under substantive due process—the Court was deeply divided over whether
to actually treat the right as fundamental, what the scope of the right should
be, and the proper standard of review for such cases.90 While the Court’s
plurality recognized parental rights as a fundamental liberty arising out of the
Fourteenth Amendment, it chose to only consider questions related to this
liberty using a lower standard of review—rational-basis.91 Thus, while the
Court deemed parental rights to be fundamental in dicta, the plurality
refused to treat parental rights as such and instead chose to allow the
government to regulate this area as long as it could show a rational
government interest for such regulation.92
Justice Souter in his concurrence acknowledged the confusion the Court’s
precedent created but urged the Court to avoid venturing into a discussion
of substantive due process to determine the scope of parental rights and to
instead simply decide the case at hand.93 He also urged that the Court
maintain the status quo and not create any “fresh furrows in the ‘treacherous
field’ of substantive due process.”94 Thus, while agreeing that parental rights
were important, Justice Souter argued for a case-by-case facial test to
determine whether the historical parental right was violated.95
By contrast, Justice Thomas, in his concurrence, argued for a change in
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94
95

Id. at 72.
Id. at 65.
Id.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 65–75.
Id. at 66–73.
See id. at 75–79 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 76 (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 502 (1977)).
Id. at 78–79.
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parental rights jurisprudence.96 First, he hinted that the Court should
reexamine its substantive due process doctrine and whether it was proper for
the judiciary to protect unenumerated rights as “fundamental” under the Due
Process Clause.97 However, since this issue was not before the Court, Justice
Thomas argued that because the Court’s precedent held parental rights to be
a fundamental right, they should be treated as such by the courts and
evaluated using strict scrutiny.98 This would force the government to prove a
compelling state interest before it could infringe on the right of a parent to
direct their child’s upbringing.99
Diverging from the majority, Justices Stevens,100 Scalia,101 and Kennedy
dissented.102 Justice Stevens argued that parental rights were actually much
more limited than the majority suggested and that the focus should be aimed
more towards the interests of the child.103 By contrast, Justice Scalia, while
arguing that parental rights were a God-given fundamental right, rejected
substantive due process immediately and argued that unenumerated rights
should not be protected by a theory of substantive due process.104 Instead, he
urged that policymaking, such as protecting parental rights, was the role of
the legislature and that the federal courts have no role to play in such
dispute.105
Thus, Troxel v. Granville shows that while the Court’s majority,106 Justice
Souter,107 and Justice Thomas108 held parental rights to be an important
unenumerated right—and a majority of the Justices are even willing to call it
fundamental—109there is disagreement as to whether the right should actually
be treated as fundamental and how this would affect state law.110 Yet, this
96

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Id.
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Id.
100
See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
101
See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102
See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
103
Id. at 80–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
104
Id. at 91–92 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
105
Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 57, 65.
107
Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
108
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
109
Id. at 66 (“[I]t cannot now be doubted that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right of parents to make decisions concerning the
care, custody, and control of their children.”).
110
See id. at 86–87, 90–91 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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confusion about how the Court defines and protects unenumerated
fundamental rights under the Due Process Clause is not confined to merely
parental rights but extends to other areas of the law as well. Abortion is a
prime example.111 While the Court has not qualified abortion as a
fundamental right since Roe v. Wade, and abortion is often analyzed using
only an intermediate scrutiny standard,112 the Court has rarely upheld a
regulation imposed on abortion.113 This suggests that, at least in practice, the
Court views the right as fundamental. By contrast, the Court deemed an
amorphous right to privacy fundamental, yet the Court has neither defined
the boundaries of such a right nor dealt with the challenges to privacy posed
by modern technological advances.114 Clearly, it is necessary for the Supreme
Court to present a test that clarifies rights, such as parental rights, and
provides guidance on the scope of these rights and how to protect them.
B.

The Effect of Sociological Law on Parental Rights Jurisprudence

Confusion as to the nature and scope of parental rights is not limited
merely to the Supreme Court’s ambiguous application of its own precedent.
Recent developments in modern law as well as the changing nature of the
family itself have also contributed to the pressing need for the Court to
address the question of how best to identify and protect parental rights. Social
change inevitably causes confusion in the area of fundamental rights
jurisprudence, especially when a court attempts to consider the nature and
scope of an unenumerated right. This is because any “‘[s]ubstantive due
process’ analysis must begin with a careful description of the asserted
right . . . .”115 The often dramatic effects that sociological changes in family
structure and social order have on the law further reveal the importance of
having a proper standard for identifying and balancing a citizen’s rights and
responsibilities, grounded in more than just dependence on the “new insight”
and changed understandings of any one generation as to what constitutes a

111
The author’s use of abortion should in no way be construed as agreement with the
suggestion that the Due Process Clause protects a right to abortion. On the contrary, the
author contends that Roe, as well as its progeny, was, as the Court has noted of another
terrible decision affecting human rights, “gravely wrong the day it was decided” and “has no
place in law under the Constitution.” Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2423 (2018) (citation
omitted). In the context of this Note, abortion is merely used to show the Court’s
inconsistency when defining fundamental rights.
112
See June Med. Servs. v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2132–33 (2020).
113
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 974–901 (1992).
114
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484–85 (1965).
115
Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993) (citations omitted).
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liberty interest.116
The Court’s confusion on the correct standard for parental rights and the
fundamental nature of the rights under the law stems from the modern
confusion among the legal community about the definition and role of the
family in society.117 The family was once clearly defined as a separate
institution in society protected by the law.118 However, modern trends
towards individual autonomy and cosmopolitanism have changed the law’s
view of the family.119
Historically, the law clearly defined the family as an institution established
by the law of nature—a voluntary association between a man and a woman,
their children, and their extended family.120 The family unit was the most
important association in life and therefore the foundation, not only of civil
society, but of government itself.121 This view of the family created a high
regard for parental rights in the common law.122 However, the Court’s
changing interpretation of substantive due process rights during the
twentieth century created an underlying shift in the legal definition of the
family.123
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law still retained a
traditional view of the family as the legal definition for purposes of the
common law.124 It was on the basis of this relationship—the sanctity of the
family and its privacy interest—that the Supreme Court took the first drastic
step in its right to privacy jurisprudence and invalidated Connecticut’s anti116

See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 660, 664 (2015).
See id. at 663–72 (reasoning of the Court here provides a perfect example of the type
of shift in beliefs about the family that directly affect parental rights); Moore v. City of East
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503–06 (1977); see also WIS. FAM. IMPACT SEMINARS, WHAT IS A
FAMILY? 18–23 (2015), https://www.purdue.edu/hhs/hdfs/fii/wpcontent/uploads/2015/07/s_wifis01c02.pdf.
118
1 JOSEPH STORY, NATURAL LAW, ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 152 (Francis Lieber ed.,
Phila., Lea & Blanchard 1844); Scott Yenor, The True Origin of Society: The Founders on the
Family, HERITAGE FOUND. (Oct. 16, 2013), https://www.heritage.org/politicalprocess/report/the-true-origin-society-the-founders-the-family#_ftn49.
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The author is extremely interested in more research on how the redefinition of the
family and the jurisdictional conflict between the family and the State have transformed
American law in the modern day. However, the author will leave this scholarship for another
day. Here the family’s deep roots in law is meant only to spur a discussion of substantive due
process and how the Court should best protect unenumerated fundamental rights in the law.
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See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400–402 (1923).
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contraception law.125 However, not long after this, the Court shifted from
viewing such laws within the framework of marriage to holding that the
primary question of substantive due process in the law was always one of
individual rights.126 This began a monumental shift of focus in American law
from analyzing individuals in relation to their associations and commitments
as spouses, parents, and citizens to analyzing them only on the basis of their
autonomous, selves.127
While the Court briefly returned to a traditional view of the family in
Bowers v. Hardwick by refusing to extend due process rights beyond
traditional norms,128 it quickly developed a confused jurisprudence that
placed “the autonomy of the person” over everything else in due process
considerations.129 This view of autonomy in due process jurisprudence was
brought to a head in the Supreme Court’s 2016 decision of Obergefell v.
Hodges.130 In Obergefell, the Court used the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to recognize the legality of homosexual marriage.131
Yet, to declare homosexual marriage a fundamental right under the
Constitution’s framework of liberty, the Court had to completely redefine the
family and break with centuries of legal tradition.132 This monumental shift
was largely the product of the Court’s shifting view of liberty and due
process.133 Yet, as this Note seeks to show, the effect of such a shift on parental
rights will be severe.
Why is this shifting social and legal view on the nature of the family
important to the consideration of the proper test for judging parental rights
under substantive due process? Because it shows that formulation of a
fundamental right, especially an unenumerated one, must be based on more
than just shifting social morays. To base the formulation of a fundamental
right on shifting social morays would threaten fundamental rights and
undermine the doctrine of substantive due process by transforming the
Court’s decisions into simply “the policy preferences of the members of [the]
Court.”134 To prevent this, a more absolute and unchanging standard must
125
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U.S. 558 (2003).
129
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–75.
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be applied. Under the Court’s current substantive due process precedent, a
disciplined and careful application of the Court’s Glucksberg history and
tradition test would be enough to clarify the nature and scope of parental
rights as well as other unenumerated rights.135
C.

The Growing Jurisdictional Conflict Between Parents and the State:
The Modern Presumption of the State as Parens Patriae

Another effect of the ascendence of autonomy in fundamental rights
jurisprudence that has caused confusion on the proper application of
unenumerated parental rights in American law is the modern presumption
that the State has almost absolute authority over the family and children
under the doctrine of parens patriae. The doctrine of parens patriae, which is
translated as “parent of the country” was essentially defined by the Supreme
Court in Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico as the duty of the
government to step in to protect and care for people who cannot care for
themselves as long as there is some quasi-governmental interest.136
Traditionally, American law limited this doctrine to limited situations: when
an individual is incapable of caring for themselves or when a group is in need
of protection.137
The question of how this doctrine applies to parental rights is unclear.
However, historically the Court held that the parens patriae interest is best
served when the family unit is maintained.138 Despite the limited nature of
this doctrine in American law, it seems that some modern day legal scholars
would extend it so far that even liberties protected by the Due Process Clause,
such as parental rights, would suffer.139 In fact, some go so far as to argue that
government control over traditional parental functions should per se

135
The question of the proper test for determining rights should lead the Court to realize
that fundamental rights cannot simply be based in history and tradition. Law must be based
on a deeper absolute of right and wrong and should lead back to a natural law jurisprudence
as the only proper and unchanging foundation of liberty.
136
Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592, 600–01, 607 (1982) (“[A]
State has a quasi-sovereign interest in the health and well-being--both physical and
economic--of its residents in general.”).
137
Late Corp. of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. United States, 136 U.S.
1, 58 (1890).
138
Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 766–67 (1982).
139
See Elizabeth Bartholet, Homeschooling: Parent Rights Absolutism vs. Child Rights to
Education & Protection, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 57–59 (2020) (asserting that homeschooling
should be banned and that the burden is on parents to demonstrate justification for receiving
permission to homeschool).
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preempt parental wishes in key areas such as education.140 This argument is
grounded in the belief that the State’s view of how a child should be raised is
more important than the individual family’s view.141 Yet, because of the
implied nature of the child’s right within the American system of government
and modern controversy surrounding the limits and extent of such a right,
the correct line to draw in protecting such a right remains unclear. This
makes parental rights the perfect case through which to reexamine the
Court’s substantive due process framework and how it affects parental and
other unenumerated rights.
The current problem in parental rights jurisprudence is highlighted by the
Court’s inconsistent application of a test for parental rights, the Court
creeping towards a sociological application of substantive due process, and
the effect that changing views of liberty have on the law. The confusion on
the limits and scope of parental rights raises the question of whether the
Court’s substantive due process doctrine provides an adequate method of
discovering and protecting unenumerated rights. Is the doctrine itself
inadequate or is it simply a matter of the test’s inadequate application to
certain areas of the law? Should the Court even attempt such an analysis or
leave the question solely to the political sphere to define the rights and
liberties of Americans? A coherent solution to these questions may be
presented through careful application of the Glucksberg test to such
situations.
IV. PROTECTING PARENTAL RIGHTS UNDER GLUCKSBERG’S HISTORY
AND TRADITION TEST
Despite the Court creating confusion around parental rights and
acknowledging the difficulty of the issue, a disciplined and meticulous
application of the Court’s history and tradition test under substantive due
process, as laid out in Washington v. Glucksberg, may not only be enough to
solve this issue, but also protect parental rights and provide clarity in this area
of the law. While the Court, in dicta, provided a historical analysis of parental
rights and acknowledged the rights’ fundamental nature, even the Court’s
latest opinion admits that it has not conscientiously applied the history and
tradition test to parental rights to define the scope and boundary of these
140
Id. at 57 (“The new legal regime should impose a presumptive ban on homeschooling,
allowing an exception for parents who can satisfy a burden of justification. And it should
impose significant restrictions on any homeschooling allowed under this exception.”).
141
Id. at 58, 66. (“There are bases in current law for thinking that the Supreme Court
should conclude that the Federal Constitution provides children with positive rights to
education and protection. One lies in the [D]ue [P]rocess [C]lause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.”).
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rights.142 The history and tradition test is by no means the only, or even
possibly the most effective, way to protect unenumerated liberties.143
However, a careful and disciplined application of the history and tradition
test in the past has resulted in clearly defined rights and the protection of
liberty.144 The best example of this is the Court’s scrupulous analysis and
rejection of an asserted right to assisted suicide in Washington v. Glucksberg.
To prove the test’s saliency, this Note will apply Glucksberg’s careful
articulation of the history and tradition test to parental rights and conclude
that such application will better define and clarify the right. First, parental
rights will be defined by applying Justice Rehnquist’s assiduous application
of the history and tradition test, and then a historical analysis will be
conducted to see if these rights are “deeply rooted” in the “history and
tradition[s]” of the American people.145 Not only can the Court clearly define
parental rights, but that definition is plainly protected by judicial and legal
history. Because parental rights are easily defined and deeply grounded in the
history and tradition of American law, they should be afforded fundamental
status and governed under a strict scrutiny standard of review.146
A.

Parental Rights Defined

The first step in applying the Glucksberg history and tradition test to
parental rights is fairly simple: define the terms.147 Defining the terms is
meant to provide a “careful description” of the right at issue and to provide a
solid basis for the historical analysis of the right.148 While acknowledging that
not all issues can be perfectly or specifically defined, the Court held that
attempts to define the right in question limit the power of judicial review and
at the very least allows the right to be “carefully refined by concrete
examples.”149
Parental rights, as a general term, have often been defined by the Supreme
142

Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 78 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring).
This solution leaves unanswered the debate over substantive due process and judicial
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See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
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Court as “the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”150 This definition has a historical
basis in the Western legal tradition. Sir William Blackstone similarly defined
these rights when he noted that parents have an obligation to their children’s
“maintenance, their protection, and their education.”151 This definition will
be used throughout this Note to refer to the authority of parents to direct the
total upbringing of their children,152 such a definition has never been greatly
debated. The only question is whether the right is fundamental and if strict
scrutiny should apply, thereby requiring the government to prove a
compelling interest before interfering with that right. With this definition
settled, the second step is to proceed to a historical analysis of the right.
B.

A Strict History and Tradition Analysis of Parental Rights

The next step in analyzing parental rights under the history and tradition
test is to subject the definition to a strict history and tradition analysis.153
Under this analysis, the specific definition is carefully examined to see
whether it “objectively” fits within the historical and traditional rights
protected by American law.154 If it fits, the right is viewed as fundamental and
can only be overturned after passing a strict scrutiny standard of review.155
The purpose behind this historical analysis is to determine whether the right
in question is a “principle of justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience
of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”156
An analysis of parental rights demonstrates that the intimacy of family life
and parental rights have always been regarded with extreme deference under
American law.157 For example, the rights of parents to direct the upbringing
of their children is deeply rooted in the Western legal tradition and protected

150
Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925); see also Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (“[T]he right of the individual to . . . establish a home and bring up
children[.]”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (“[T]he interest of parents in the
care, custody, and control of their children.”).
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in dicta by multiple Supreme Court precedents.158 Because of this, parental
rights should be afforded deference as a fundamental right in American
jurisprudence. Parental rights’ place in the Western legal tradition will be
examined and then Supreme Court precedent on the right will be addressed.
1.

Parental Rights in the Western Legal Tradition

Parental rights have long held an exalted place in Western legal tradition.
In the early days of the American republic, Blackstone, looking to preeminent
patriarchs of the Western legal tradition such as Puffendorf and
Montesquieu, argued that the right of parents, indeed the “duty” of parents,
to direct their child’s upbringing was inherent in the law of nature.159 James
Kent noted in his Commentaries that “the obligation of parental duty is so
well secured by the strength of natural affection, that it seldom requires to be
enforced by human laws.”160 Furthermore, Kent laid out the legal standard
for parental rights in early American law arguing that “[w]hat is necessary
for the child is left to the discretion of the parent . . . there must be a clear
omission of duty, as to necessaries, before a third person can interfere . . . .”161
Thus, the early days of the Republic were marked by great deference to
parental rights in the highest levels of American law.162
Yet, this respect for parental rights was grounded in more than just a
cultural moray. Indeed, the respect for parental rights in early American law
was grounded in a distinctive jurisprudence that held an even deeper respect
for the unique and distinct role of the family as a separate jurisdictional unit
from the State with different obligations and duties.163 As Eric DeGroff notes,
Blackstone and other early scholars of the Western legal tradition viewed the
family, as created by God, to be the very first governmental and societal unit
in creation.164 As a result, the family has historically been viewed by American
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law as an institution with sovereignty independent of the State.165 Justice
Parker of the Alabama Supreme Court highlighted this sovereignty by
quoting and agreeing with Abraham Kuyper who affirmed:
Behind these organic spheres, with intellectual, aesthetical
and technical sovereignty, the sphere of the family opens
itself, with its right of marriage, domestic peace, education
and possession; and in this sphere also the natural head is
conscious of exercising an inherent authority,--not because
the government allows it, but because God has imposed it.
Paternal authority roots itself in the very life-blood and is
proclaimed in the fifth Commandment. . . . A people
therefore which abandons to State Supremacy the right of
the family . . . is just as guilty before God, as a nation which
lays its hands upon the rights of the magistrates.166
However, this view of family sovereignty was not confined to a uniquely
religious view of American law. John Locke, a key Enlightenment
philosopher who was heavily influenced by the Biblical foundation of AngloAmerican law, held the same view and argued that the State and the family
were completely different governmental units, sovereign within their own
jurisdictions.167 In fact the Supreme Court recognized this point in Parham
v. J.R. when it ruled that the Western legal tradition has long held the family
to be a separate jurisdictional unit from the State; so much so that there is a
presumption in favor of parental authority and wisdom unless proven abuse
has occurred in that case.168 Thus, American law was founded on a deep
respect for and recognition of the family as a separate institution and the
unique role of parents in raising their children.
2.

Supreme Court Precedent on Parental Rights

However, when analyzing a right under the history and tradition test, not
only must the general Western legal tradition be consulted, but prior
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Supreme Court precedent on the issue must also be considered. This is
because prior Supreme Court precedent is a helpful guidepost in revealing
whether the right at issue really is grounded in American legal tradition to
the extent necessary to classify it as a fundamental right.169 Thus, if a right is
fundamental, it is likely, although not certain, that the Supreme Court will
have considered the issue before.
The Supreme Court has long acknowledged parental rights as a
fundamental and basic principle of American law with protections that the
Court largely grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause.170 In the landmark parental rights decision Pierce v. Society of Sisters,
the Supreme Court recognized the rights of parents as “fundamental” and
acknowledged that parents, not the State, have the primary duty to raise their
children to be good adults and citizens.171 The Court opined that the rights of
parents to lead and guide their children’s upbringing are critical rights
recognized in American law.172 Further, the Court accepted the arguments of
the appellee that parental rights are part of “the very essence of personal
liberty and freedom.”173 The Court noted:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all
governments in this Union repose excludes any general
power of the State to standardize its children by forcing them
to accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is
not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him
and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high
duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional
obligations.174
This decision built upon the Supreme Court’s ruling in Meyer v. Nebraska,
which explicitly rejected a statist view of childrearing and held that “our
institutions rest[ed]” on much different grounds.175 In Meyer, the Court
rejected a Nebraska state law that forbade teaching children in any language
but English.176 The Court held that while the State had a proper interest in
educating and preparing the children of the United States to be good citizens,
169
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the fundamental common law rights of parents to oversee their children’s
education trumps the State’s interest.177 As Carl Zollmann noted, a key
feature of the decision—one that would shape all other parental rights
decisions after it—was the Meyer Court’s determination to ground parental
rights in a substantive due process analysis of the Fourteenth Amendment.178
Thus, for the first time, the Court held that the rights of parents in raising
their children as they see fit is a “privilege[] long recognized at common law
as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.”179
Later, in Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court, while acknowledging
that the State has an interest in the propagation of morality and civic virtue,
affirmed a high view of parental independence.180 The Court determined that
any conflict between parents and the State “over [the] control of the child and
his training” is extremely significant, but especially regarding matters of
worldview.181 The Court held that:
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of
the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function
and freedom include preparation for obligations the state
can neither supply nor hinder. And it is in recognition of this
that these decisions have respected the private realm of
family life which the state cannot enter.182
Thus, the Court’s dicta yet again showed a level of deference to parental rights
that can only be maintained by judging the right under a standard of strict
scrutiny.183
The Supreme Court held such a view of parental rights, at least in dicta if
not in practice, until Troxel, where the Court revealed the unclear test that
failed to give a distinct standard for how the Court should govern its
decisions with these issues.184 This decision, while upholding parental rights,
revealed the flaw inherent in the Court’s previous parental rights
jurisprudence: the Court had never explicitly acknowledged a standard by
which parental rights issues should be judged. It is clear from the Court’s
177
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current precedent that while the Court has not treated parental rights as
fundamental in the standard of review it has applied, it has acknowledged
parental rights to be fundamental rights on numerous occasions.185 This lack
of clarity as well as the Court’s confusion in recent years as to the definition
of the family has created a crisis of parental rights in modern law.186
C.

Results of Glucksberg’s Application to Parental Rights

Application of the Glucksberg test to parental rights reveals a fundamental
right. In applying Glucksberg’s two-part test, first defining the right and then
providing a historical analysis, it is clear that parental rights can be
specifically defined and have a long application in U.S. legal history.187
Parental rights may be easily defined as the “liberty of parents and guardians
to direct the upbringing and education of children under their control.”188
The ready ability of the Court to come up with a succinct and clear definition
lends credence to the argument that parental rights, although unenumerated,
are fundamental.
Application of the second prong of the Glucksberg test also shows that
parental rights are deeply embedded in Western legal tradition, which has
always recognized hem as important. Even the earliest American legal
scholars argued that parental control over the upbringing of their children
was preeminent.189 The Supreme Court upheld this view of parental rights in
dicta on multiple occasions with the Court determining that parents have the
preeminent responsibility and authority to raise their children and that the
State may not infringe on this relationship other than in the most exigent
circumstances.190 Thus, a historical analysis of parental rights reveals that the
rights of parents are part of the most “basic values that underlie our
society.”191
Parental rights easily meet the Glucksberg two-prong test of being (1) easily
definable and (2) backed by history and tradition.192 What does this mean for
the standard of review? Parental rights should be afforded the highest and
strictest standard of protections because it has proven to be “so rooted in the
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traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.”193
Being a fundamental right, the Court should examine challenges to parental
rights using a strict scrutiny framework, and any balancing of state interests
against that right should weigh heavily in favor of the parental right such that
it would require a compelling governmental interest to overcome the
presumption in favor of parental rights.194
Many have argued that unenumerated rights such as parental rights
should be enumerated through constitutional amendment or statutory
enactment instead of relying on the Court to protect the right through strict
scrutiny.195 This approach would be extremely helpful because it would
provide clear protections for these rights as well as an opportunity for a
spirited social debate on such issues. Further, when considering rights that
are fundamental, there must be a stopgap mechanism to provide immediate
and realistic protection without resorting to the uncertainty of the political
process. Further, apart from the debate on substantive due process, parental
liberty is so fundamental in its essence that it is within the inherent judicial
duty of the Court to protect it from government overreach.196
Moreover, applying the Glucksberg test by the Court to parental rights
opens an opportunity for the Court to clarify its unenumerated fundamental
rights jurisprudence under the Due Process Clause. The Court should expand
its use of the Glucksberg test to all unenumerated fundamental rights. If the
Court does this, a more coherent view of substantive due process would
emerge as rights are carefully defined and subjected to a historical analysis to
determine whether they are fundamental in nature. This would clarify and
limit the application of substantive due process to only those rights the Court
can define and then show by historical analysis to be “deeply rooted” in the
“history and tradition[s]” of the American people.197 Such a result would
protect liberty while allowing the State to limit modern “rights” such as
abortion that have no grounding in history or tradition and do great harm to
society, its institutions, and its people.
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V. CONCLUSION
When afforded proper deference through application of Glucksberg’s
history and tradition test, it becomes clear that although unenumerated,
parental rights are a fundamental right. The Supreme Court should revise its
interpretation of substantive due process to use Glucksberg’s clear two-part
test for any unenumerated rights question arising under the substantive due
process framework. This will clarify unenumerated fundamental rights and
allow the Court to properly define them and outline their correct scope.
When the Court does this, it will afford parental rights proper deference as a
fundamental right and govern it under a standard of strict scrutiny.198
This Note has overviewed the Court’s current framework for substantive
due process and demonstrated that while the Court posits a clear and
coherent history and tradition test for defining and clarifying unenumerated
fundamental rights, the test is inconsistently used and often the Court has
been more concerned with issues of personal autonomy than with the actual
law.199 This has greatly affected fundamental rights jurisprudence and left
lower courts confused regarding the definition of a fundamental right and
how to define and determine the scope of such rights.200 Because parental
rights—like most fundamental rights—touch on key values debated within
society, it is imperative the Court have a clear test to follow in defining and
setting the scope of unenumerated fundamental rights before allowing the
State to interfere. As legal scholars struggle with the question of whether
substantive due process is the most adequate means of protecting
fundamental rights, the Glucksberg history and tradition test should provide
a way forward on parental rights and all other unenumerated fundamental
rights questions.
A careful defining of parental rights and a historical analysis of those rights
under the Glucksberg standard reveals that Courts should protect parental
rights as fundamental and govern it under a strict scrutiny standard. The
Court should reconsider its parental rights jurisprudence under the
Glucksberg standard to make application of the right more consistent with its
own dicta and a coherent application of substantive due process. Application
of this test would provide a stricter and more workable theory of substantive
due process when applied to unenumerated fundamental rights and protect
one of “those privileges long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men,”—the right to direct the upbringing
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